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Denial of Unemployment Benefits to Otherwise Eligible 
Women on the Basis of Pregnancy: Section 3304(a)(12) of 
the Federal Unemployment Tax Act 
Twenty-one million women I in the United States between the 
ages of eighteen and thirty-four are in ·the civilian labor force.2 Ap-
proximately eighty-five percent of women in this age range3 are 
likely to give birth to at least one child during their working lives.4 
The availability of unemployment compensation for women who 
wish to return to work after leaving their most recent employment 
because of pregnancy is therefore a critical issue. Unemployment 
compensation may constitute a substantial portion of the financial 
resources of these women. 5 
Although unemployment compensation is generally a matter of 
state law, the federal government has assumed a supervisory role.6 
The Federal Unemployment Tax Act7 (FUTA) established guide-
lines for the administration of state plans. A state must comply with 
these federal standards to be eligible for federal assistance.8 In 1976, 
Congress amended section 3304(a)(l2) of FUTA, prohibiting dis-
bursement of federal funds to states that deny unemployment com-
pensation "solely on the basis of pregnancy."9 
1. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION RE-
PORTS, SERIES P-20, No. 363, POPULATION PROFILE OF THE UNITED STATES: 1980, at 33 
(1981) [hereinafter cited as CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION PROFILE]. 
2. The term "civilian labor force" refers to all nonmilitary persons classified as employed 
or unemployed. Excluded are persons neither employed nor seeking work outside their own 
home, retired persons, students, seasonal workers for whom the survey fell in an off season, 
those with long-term disabilities and the voluntarily idle. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. 
DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: CONSUMER INCOME, SERIES P-60, 
No. 132, MONEY INCOME OF HOUSEHOLDS, FAMILIES AND PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 
1980, at 225 (1982) [hereinafter cited as CENSUS BUREAU, MONEY INCOME]. 
3. This age range was selected as representative of the peak childbearing years. Most of 
the data reported in a 1977 Census Bureau fertility survey relate to this age group. See U.S. 
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SE-
RIES P-20, No. 325, FERTILITY OF AMERICAN WOMEN: JUNE 1977 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 
CENSUS BUREAU, FERTILITY SURVEY]. 
4. This calculation is based on data collected in CENSUS BUREAU, FERTILITY SURVEY, 
supra note 3, at 22. See also s. KAMERMAN, MATERNITY AND PARENTAL BENEFITS AND 
LEAVES 8 (Impact on Policy Series Monograph No. I, 1980) (summary of relevant statistics). 
5. See Porcher v. Brown, 459 U.S. I 150, 1153 (1983) (White, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). 
6. See notes 34-45 infra and accompanying text for a description of federal and state coop-
eration in the field of unemployment compensation. 
7. 26 u.s.c. §§ 3301-3311 (1982). 
8. See notes 29-33 infra and accompanying text. 
9. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12) (1982). For the text of this section, see text at note 46 infra. 
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Several states and the District of Columbia 10 currently deny ben-
efits to claimants who left their last position for health reasons unre-
lated to employment. 11 In these states women who are otherwise 
entitled to unemployment compensation under state law are subject 
to probable disqualification if they terminate their employment as a 
10. The Solicitor General, in his brief as amicus curiae in Porcher v. Brown, noted that 
eight states and the District of Columbia denied benefits to claimants who left work because of 
health problems unrelated to their employment: Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, 
Oklahoma, South Carolina, West Virginia and, to a lesser extent, Vermont. Brief for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae at 18, Porcher v. Brown, 459 U.S. l 150 (1983) (denial of 
certiorari) [hereinafter cited as Amicus Curiae Brief]. Since the brief was filed, however, New 
Mexico has amended its statute to prohibit the denial of benefits solely on the basis of preg• 
nancy. N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 51-I-7(A) (1983 Rep. Vol.). Thus, although New Mexico still dis• 
qualifies claimants who leave work for causes unrelated to employment, pregnancy is exempt 
from this disqualification. 
I I. In two of these jurisdictions, the District of Columbia and Louisiana, decisions explic• 
illy upholding disqualification of women who left their last employment as a result of preg• 
nancy are in effect. Brooks v. District of Columbia Dept. of Employment Servs., 453 A.2d 812 
(App. D.C. 1982) (per curiam); Algiers Homestead Assn. v. Brown, 246 La. 738, 167 So. 2d 349 
(1964). The Brooks case involved a pregnant security guard who separated from her job be-
cause the heavy belt holding her revolver and other items that she was required to wear 
pressed against her stomach, making her ill. In refusing to set aside the claimant's disqualifica-
tion, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals stated: "Nothing in the record suggests that 
her resignation was other than voluntary, and it cannot be argued that pregnancy is a work• 
related illness." 453 A.2d at 813. In Louisiana, a person leaving "his employment ..• with-
out good cause connected with his employment" is disqualified from unemployment benefits, 
LA. R.Ev. STAT. ANN.§ 23:1601(1) (West 1964 & Supp. 1984). In Algiers Homestead, a woman 
who left work because of illness due to pregnancy was denied benefits because this cause was 
unconnected with her employment. 246 La. at 744, 167 So. 2d at 351. See also Martin Mills v. 
Department of Employment Sec., 391 So. 2d 56 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (woman on maternity 
leave disqualified for duration of leave because pregnancy not connected with employment). 
In the other five jurisdictions, no cases involving pregnancy disqualification have been re-
ported, although some may have arisen at the commission level. However, judicial decisions 
or statutory provisions relating to the denial of benefits on the basis of other medical condi-
tions suggest that a woman who leaves her work because of a pregnancy-related condition 
would be denied benefits if she were not reinstated when she sought to return to work. 
The Missouri Court of Appeals has held that an employee's illness is not to be considered 
grounds for involuntary termination unless the illness was caused or aggravated by the em-
ployer. Duffy v. Labor & Indus. Relations Commn., 556 S.W.2d 195, 198 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). 
Leaving work because of pregnancy is regarded as voluntary. Davis v. Labor & Indus. Rela-
tions Commn., 554 S.W.2d 541 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). In Nebraska, the standard is that a 
termination must be involuntary and for good cause attributable to the employer. Thus, bene-
fits have been awarded to an employee who left work because factors directly connected with 
his employment caused his illness. Glionna v. Chizek, 204 Neb. 37, 40, 281 N,W.2d 220, 223 
(1973). 
Oklahoma, by statute, sanctions disqualification for voluntarily leaving employment with-
out good cause connected with employment. OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, § 2-404 (1981). The suc-
ceeding section makes an allowance for illness in cases where job conditions so change that the 
job becomes detrimental to the employee's health. OKLA. STAT, tit. 40, § 2-405 (1981). Pre-
sumably, pregnancy would not fit within the exception provided in§ 2-405. Similarly, Ver-
mont and West Virginia provide for statutory disqualification of an employee who leaves his 
last employment voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer. VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 21, § 1344(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE§ 21A-6-3(1) (1978). Until 1982, persons in 
West Virginia who left their last employment for health-related reasons were disqualified from 
receipt of benefits under the authority of State v. Hix, 132 W. Va. 516, 54 S.E.2d 198 (1949). In 
1982, the West Virginia Court of Appeals overruled Hix in relevant part in Gibson v. Rut-
ledge, 298 S.E.2d 137 (W. Va. 1982). It is not clear whether the Gibson decision will encom-
pass denial of benefits on the basis of pregnancy. 
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result of pregnancy. In effect, these states interpret section 
3304(a)(12) to require only that pregnancy not be treated differently 
from any medical condition not connected with employment.12 The 
Department of Labor, the agency charged with evaluating state 
plans, 13 endorses this interpretation of the statute. 14 
In a recent Fourth Circuit case, Brown v. Porcher, 15 two formerly 
pregnant women challenged this reading of section 3304(a)(l2). The 
court held that South Carolina's policy of denying benefits to women 
who left their last employment because of pregnancy violated the 
mandate of section 3304(a)(12), regardless of the state's treatment of 
claimants who separated from work because of other medical condi-
tions.16 The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in the Porcher 
case, with three justices dissenting. 17 The Court's disposition of the 
petition allows discordant interpretations of section 3304(a)(12) to 
stand.18 
This Note examines the conflicting interpretations of section 
3304(a)(12) of the Federal Act. The Porcher decision serves as a 
point of reference throughout this Note, since opposing constructions 
of the section were presented in the case. Part I describes the basic 
framework of FUTA and presents the disparate interpretations of 
section 3304(a)(12) that have been advanced. 
Part II analyzes section 3304(a)(12) with reference to the statu-
tory language and legislative history. As a preliminary matter, this 
part considers the degree of deference that should be afforded the 
12. See Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 10, at 8. 
13. Each year on October 31 the Secretary of Labor must certify to the Secretary of the 
Treasury each state whose law has been previously approved that continues to comply with 
FUTA. States that are found to be in violation of FUTA are given an opportunity for a 
hearing. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(c) (1982). 
14. See ]!.Ole 54 infra and accompanying text. 
15. Brown v. Porcher, 502 F. Supp. 946 (D.S.C. 1980), mod!fted and remanded, 660 F.2d 
1001 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1150 (1983). 
16. 660 F.2d at 1004. See also notes 47-63 infra and accompanying text (description of the 
Porcher opinion); 20 J. FAM. L. 572 (1981-82) (brief overview of Porcher decision). 
17. 459 U.S. 1150 (1983). Justice White, joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist, dis-
sented. For a discussion of Justice White's dissent, see note 63 infra and accompanying text. 
18. As a result, administrators of state plans cannot be sure exactly what standard the 
Federal Act imposes. See 459 U.S. at 1152 (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
In addition, working women who are pregnant, or who may become pregnant in the future, 
have an identifiable interest in a reliable guideline. The Porcher decision applies only to South 
Carolina's law. The Secretary of Labor can continue to certify other state plans that deny 
benefits to women who left work because of pregnancy on the same basis that benefits are 
denied to persons who leave their job for any other medical condition unrelated to their em-
ployment. 
Although no estimate is available of the amount of the total additional benefit that states 
would have to pay if they were required to include in their plans eligible women who leave 
work because of pregnancy, considerable resources are undoubtedly at issue. The United 
States, in its amicus curiae brief in Porcher, reported that South Carolina was paying an addi-
tional $1.5 million in benefits and estimated that West Virginia, which is also in the Fourth 
Circuit, would be liable for about the same amount. Amicus Curia Brief, supra note 10, at 18. 
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Secretary of Labor's certification of state programs that treat preg-
nancy like all other medical conditions for purposes of denial of ben-
efits. This Note argues that the Secretary's determination that these 
plans satisfy the requirement of FUTA is not dispositive because: 
(1) the statutory language does not vest absolute discretion in the 
Secretary of Labor and (2) courts are not required to endorse admin-
istrative readings that conflict with the enabling statute or the policy 
behind it. On the basis of the statutory language and the available 
legislative history, this Note concludes that Congress, in enacting 
section 3304(a)(l2), intended that a pregnant woman's necessary sep-
aration from work, as determined by the woman and her physician, 
should not be the basis for denial of benefits if the woman seeks to 
return to work after childbirth but is not reemployed. 
Part III discusses policy considerations relevant to analysis of 
section 3304(a)(12). Because pregnancy uniquely affects women, 
statutes that deny benefits because of pregnancy may discriminate on 
the basis of sex. In addition, Congress and the courts have recog-
nized both the important economic contributions of women in the 
work force and the fundamental personal and societal interests re-
lated to procreation. States that deny unemployment benefits to wo-
men on the basis of pregnancy force women to choose between 
employment and childbirth, thus frustrating these policies. 
This Note further contends that treating pregnancy in the same 
manner as other medical conditions glosses over the fact that virtu-
ally all pregnant women must at some point leave their employment 
to attend to childbirth. Allowing the states to group pregnancy with 
other medical conditions effectively permits the states indirectly to 
deny benefits on the basis of pregnancy when they clearly could not 
do so directly, in disregard of the fact that Congress specifically ad-
dressed the issue of pregnancy-related disqualifications in section 
3304(a)(l2).19 
I. SECTION 3304(a)(l2) IN CONTEXT AND THE CURRENT 
CONTROVERSY OVER ITS INTERPRETATION 
A. Federal Involvement in Unemployment Compensation 
Unemployment compensation in the United States is a coopera-
tive federal-state venture.20 Distribution to individual claimants is 
generally a matter of state law. All states require a claimant to sat-
19. This Note recognizes that the language and history of § 3304(a)(l2) do not require 
payment of benefits to all pregnant claimants. For example, women who make themselves 
unavailable for work while still able to work or who elect to remain home after childbirth are 
ineligible. Rather, the provision was added to prohibit states from denying compensation to 
otherwise eligible women on the ground that they left their last employment as a result of 
pregnancy. 
20. See note 35 iefra. 
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isfy some form of a three-tier test.21 First, the claimant must meet 
the state's qualifying requirements before filing for benefits. This in-
volves working for a statutorily defined period or earning a specified 
amount of wages.22 Second, the unemployed worker must be eligi-
ble to receive benefits. To be eligible an individual must be both 
able to work and available for work.23 Third, the worker must not 
be subject to any disqualification prescribed by the statute.24 The 
most common reasons for disqualification25 include voluntarily leav-
ing the job without good cause,26 discharge for misconduct27 and re-
fusal of suitable work.28 The federal government performs a 
supervisory function through a system of tax incentives.29 FUTA 
provides for grants to state governments30 and tax credits to employ-
ers31 in states certified by the Secretary of Labor as having complied 
21. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 10, at 3; see also W. HABER & M. MURRAY, UNEM-
PLOYMENT INSURANCE IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 113-19 (1966) (describing general re-
quirements for unemployment compensation). 
22. This requirement is designed to measure the claimant's attachment to the labor market. 
W. HABER & M. MURRAY, supra note 21, at 113. The idea is to insure some link between the 
source of unemployment funds and their expenditure. Without some type of qualifying re-
quirement, compensation pools might be depleted by persons who work intermittently at the 
expense of the regularly employed. See R. ALTMAN, AVAILABILITY FOR WORK 75 (1950). 
23. SeeR. ALTMAN, supra note 22, at 84; W. HABER & M. MURRAY, supra note 21, at 264-
65. 
24. A principal function of unemployment compensation is to assist individuals who are 
involuntarily unemployed. See Economic Security Act: Hearings on S. 1130 Before the Senate 
Comm. on Finance, 14th Cong., 1st Sess. 1328 (1935). Disqualifications are imposed to elimi-
nate claimants whose unemployment results from their own actions. W. HABER & M. MUR-
RAY, supra note 21, at 114. 
25. NATIONAL COMMN. ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPEN-
SATION: FINAL REPORT46 (1980). Seea/soR. ALTMAN, supra note 22, at 81; W. HABER & M. 
MURRAY, supra note 21, at 114. 
26. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-775(1) (1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1106{a) 
(Repl. 1976 & Supp. 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 19, § 3315(1)(Repl. 1979 & Supp. 1982); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-5(a) (West 1962 & Supp. 1984). 
27. See, e.g., ALA. CODE§ 25-4-78(3) (1975); D.C. CODE ANN. § 46-lll{b) (1981); LA. 
RE.v. STAT. ANN.§ 23:1601(2) (West 1964 & Supp. 1984); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151A, 
§ 25(e) (West 1976 & Supp. 1984). 
28. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.§ 23.20.379(b) (1981); FLA. STAT.§ 443.101(2) (1983); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 42l.29(l)(e) (1979). 
29. FUTA levies an excise tax on employers in an amount equal to a percentage of wages 
paid. 26 U.S.C. § 3301 (1982). The term "wages" includes the cash value of all remuneration 
for employment, subject to several listed exclusions. 26 U.S.C. § 3306(b) (1982). Employers 
are then allowed a credit of up to 90% of the federal tax for contributions to state plans that 
have been approved by the Secretary of Labor. 26 U.S.C. § 3302 (1982). For a brief descrip-
tion of the mechanics of FUTA, see California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 397 
(1982); Saint Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 775 n.3 
(1981); Brown v. Porcher, 502 F. Supp. at 947. 
30. 26 u.s.c. § 3304 (1982). 
The Social Security Act authorizes release of federal funds to state governments found to 
be in compliance with federal standards. 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-504, 1101-1108 (1982). These 
grants are to be used to defray the costs of administering the state's compensation program. 42 
U.S.C. § llOl(c)(l)(B) (1982). 
31. 26 U.S.C. § 3302 (1982). An employer is defined as anyone who, during the calendar 
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with the fundamental federal standards enumerated in section 
3304(a).32 Unemployment compensation is thus grounded in federal 
law, but its execution is a function of state law.33 
The original Federal Act34 was adopted in 1935, in the wake of 
the Great Depression.35 The objective was to encourage the states to 
establish unemployment compensation plans.36 Despite a variety of 
year, paid at least $1,500 in wages or employed at least one person for any portion of20 days 
in 20 different weeks. Wages paid for domestic services are excluded. 26 U.S.C. § 3306(a)(l) 
(1982). 
32. See note 13 supra. Section 3304(a) presently lists 17 requirements for approval of a 
state plan. These requirements have been termed fundamental federal standards because Con-
gress has stated that federal aid is available only to those states which meet these basic prereq• 
uisites. See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 594 (1937); see also New York Tel. Co. 
v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 440 U.S. 519,539 (1979) (quoting Steward Mach., 301 U.S. 
at 594); California Dept. of Human Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121 (1971). Some of the 
§ 3304(a) requirements concern administration of state programs. For example, § 3304(a)(l) 
requires that all compensation be paid through public employment agencies or other agencies 
that have beeµ. approved by the Secretary of Labor. Others focus on actions that must be 
taken by the claimant. For example, § 3304(a)(7) states that "an individual who has received 
compensation during his benefit year is required to have had work since the beginning of such 
year in order to qualify for compensation in his next benefit year." · 
Two subsections regulate payment of benefits to certain classes of employees. See 26 
U.S.C. § 3304(a)(l3) (1982) (athletes); 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(l4) (1982) (aliens). Two additional 
subsections prohibit denial of benefits under given circumstances. Section 3304(a)(5) prohibits 
denial of benefits to an otherwise eligible claimant who refuses to accept new work because of 
any of the following conditions: (I) the position is available as a result ofa labor dispute (e.g., 
strike); (2) the wages or work conditions are not as favorable as the prevailing conditions for 
similar work; or (3) acceptance of the work would require the claimant to join a company 
union or to resign from or refrain from joining a labor organization. Section 3304(a)(l2) states 
that "no person shall be denied compensation under such State law solely on the basis of 
pregnancy or termination of pregnancy." 
All 50 states and the District of Columbia are at present certified by the Secretary of Labor. 
See Saint Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772,775 n.3 (1981); 
Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234, 236 n.l (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
33. NATIONAL COMMN. ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, supra note 25, at 14. 
34. The original unemployment insurance provisions were enacted under Title IX of the 
Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 74-271 §§ 301-303, 49 Stat. 620, 626-27 (1935). 
The same provisions were assimilated into the 1939 Internal Revenue Code as the Federal 
Unemployment Tax Act, ch. 23, §§ 3301-3308, 68A Stat. 439-54 (1954). See generally lB 
UNEMPL. INs. REP. (CCH) t 1020 (Sept. 29, 1980) (description offederal unemployment legis-
lation). The Federal Act is currently part of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-
3311 (1982). 
35. The federal government became involved in unemployment compensation in response 
to widespread unemployment in the aftermath of the Great Depression. A few states, e.g., 
Wisconsin and New Hamsphire, attempted to meet the needs of the unemployed by imposing 
a tax on employers. Most states, however, feared that such a tax would drive industry to other 
states with more favorable tax laws. See generally 15 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 381, 382-84 (1981) 
(concise summary of the history of the Federal Act as well as a comprehensive list of related 
sources). See also Saint Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 
775 (1981); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 587-88 (1937); H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1935) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 615]; S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 
1st Sess. 12, 13 (1935) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 628]. The plan of federal-state coopera-
tion was thus aimed at stimulating creation of state compensation plans, within the constraints 
offederalism. See Standard Dredging Corp. v. Murphy, 319 U.S. 306, 310 (1942); Buckstaff 
Bath House Co. v. McKinley, 308 U.S. 358, 363 (1939); New Hampshire Dept. of Employment 
Sec. v. Marshall, 616 F.2d 240, 241 (1st Cir. 1980), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 806 (1980). 
36. The idea was to furnish an incentive for the states to provide benefits to the newly 
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amendments to the Federal Act since it was originally passed,37 the 
basic statutory scheme has remained intact.38 Periodically, however, 
Congess has found it necessary to amend FUTA to keep the Act 
attuned to changes in the composition of the work force. 39 As a rule, 
the amendments have expanded the scope of the Act's coverage to 
include workers who were previously not protected by the federal 
guidelines.40 
In 1976, Congress adopted a series of major amendments to 
FUTA.41 These amendments were grouped into four main catego-
ries with the following objectives:42 (1) to extend unemployment 
compensation to substantially all wage and salary eamers;43 (2) to 
restore solvency to the federal and state programs; (3) to modify the 
unemployed worker "at a time when otherwise he would have nothing to spend." Economic 
Security Act: Hearings on S. 1130 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 
99, 119 (1935) (statement of Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor), quoted in California Dept. of 
Human Resources v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 131 (1971). By maintaining the worker's purchasing 
power while he looked for alternative employment, the system served to stabilize the economy 
during cycles of high unemployment. See Economic Security Act: Hearings on R.R. 4210 
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 172, 182 (1935) (statement 
of Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor), quoted in Java, 402 U.S. at 132-33. 
37. See, e.g., Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-566, 90 
Stat. 2667 (1976) (extending coverage to certain previously excluded government employees, 
farmworkers and domestic employees); 5 U.S.C. §§ 8521-8525 (1982) (extension ofbenfits to 
ex-servicemen in period following the Korean War); see also Brown v. Porcher, 502 F. Supp. 
946, 954 (D.S.C. 1980) (citing examples of congressional modification of FUTA to reflect 
changes in the work force). 
38. See New Hampshire Dept. of Employment Sec. v. Marshall, 616 F.2d 240, 241 (1st 
Cir.), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 806 (1980). 
39. See note 37 supra. For data on labor force changes during the past 20 years, see CEN-
sus BUREAU, POPULATION PROFILE, supra note l, at 29. 
40. See, e.g., Saint Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 
775 (1981). 
41. Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-566, 90 Stat. 2667 
(1976). 
42. See S. REP. No. 1265, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. 
NEWS 5997 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1265, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. 
NEWS]; H.R. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 
755]. See generally THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PuBuc POLICY REsEARCH, 
94th Cong., Rep. No. 10, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION AMENDMENTS (1976) (analysis of 
key provisions). The House report accompanying the amendments listed the objectives of the 
bill: 
The Unemployment Compensation Amendments Act of 1975 (H.R. 10210) is designed to 
achieve the following objectives: 
provide coverage under the permanent Federal-State Unemployment Compensation 
law for substantially of all the nation's wage and salary earners and thereby eliminate the 
need for the temporary Special Unemployment Assistance program; 
restore solvency in the Unemployment Compensation program at the State and Fed-
eral levels by increasing revenues in a manner that distributes fairly the impact of addi-
tional employer-paid taxes; 
modify the "trigger mechanism" in the Extended Benefits program; and 
establish a National Study Commission that will undertake a thorough and compre-
hensive examination of the present Unemployment Compensation program and make 
recommendations for further improvements. 
H.R. REP. No. 755, supra, at 1. 
43. The House Report listed the "major groups of workers that were without permanent 
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conditions for the extended benefits program; and ( 4) to establish a 
National Study Commission. The first category of modifications re-
lated to benefit eligibility.44 These provisions were designed to ex-
tend coverage by eliminating certain impediments to the receipt of 
benefits and by providing protection under permanent law to major 
groups of workers not covered under the existing law. This section 
included a provision prohibiting disbursement of federal unemploy-
ment funds to states that deny compensation solely on the basis of 
pregnancy,45 which was codified as follows: 
§3304. Approval of State Laws 
(a) Requirements - The Secretary of Labor shall approve any state 
law submitted to him, within 30 days of submission, which he finds 
provides that -
(12) No person shall be denied compensation under such State law 
solely on the basis of pregnancy or termination of pregnancy .... 46 
Thus, after 1976, states that denied benefits solely on the basis of 
pregnancy were to be ineligible for federal unemployment funds. 
Nevertheless, the ambiguity inherent in the language "solely on the 
basis of pregnancy" has led to differing interpretations of section 
3304(a)(l2). 
B. Disparate Interpretations of Section 3304(a)(l2): Brown v. 
Porcher 
The meaning of section 3304(a)(l2) was subject to judicial scru-
tiny for the first time in Brown v. Porcher.41 The plaintiffs initiated a 
class action on behalf of themselves and other women who were in-
definitely denied unemployment compensation because they left 
their last employment as a result ofpregnancy.48 In South Carolina, 
women who separated from employment because of pregnancy were 
coverage" as: (I) state and local government employees (2) agricultural employees and (3) do-
mestic workers. H.R. REP. No. 755, supra note 42, at 2. 
44. See H.R. 10210, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. title III, 122 CONG. REc. 22515 (1976). 
45. Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-566, 90 Stat. 2667 
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12) (1982)). 
46. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(l2) (1982). 
47. 502 F. Supp. 946 (D.S.C. 1980), modffeed and remanded, 660 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1981) 
(remand only to consider relief as to named plaintiffs), cert. denied, 459 U.s: 1150 (1983). See 
generally 20 J. FAM. L. 572 (1981-82) (summary of Porcher decision). 
48. 502 F. Supp. at 947, 952-53. Plaintiff Brown was a dietary aide at a county hospital. 
After she began to experience illness and discomfort due to pregnancy, her physician advised 
her to cease working if the job became too taxing. Subsequently, Mrs. Brown notified the 
hospital and terminated her employment. Shortly after giving birth, she sought to return to 
work. At that time she was informed that there were no openings. Plaintiff Johnson was 
employed as a salesclerk. She discontinued her employment because of pregnancy-related 
physical problems. Mrs. Johnson was also denied reinstatement after the birth of her child. 
502 F. Supp. at 948-49; Brief for Appellees at 3-4, Brown v. Porcher, 660 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 
1981) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellees]. 
August 1984] Note - Unemployment Benefits and Pregnancy 1933 
deemed to have quit voluntarily without good cause.49 Plaintiffs ar-
gued that this practice violated section 3304(a)(l2) of FUTA because 
it denied benefits to women otherwise able to, and available for, 
work solely on the basis of their pregnancy.50 Plaintiffs interpreted 
section 3304(a)(12) to require that pregnancy not be the determina-
tive factor in a decision to deny benefits. This interpretation w0uld 
compel decertification of plans that deny benefits to women who, but 
49. Under South Carolina law a worker is disqualified from receipt of benefits if the South 
Carolina Employment Security Commission (S.C.E.S.C.) finds he or she has left his or her 
most recent work voluntarily without good cause: 
41-35-120. Disqualification for Benefits. Any insured worker shall be ineligible for 
benefits: 
(l) Leaving work voluntarily-if the Commission finds that he has left voluntarily with-
out good cause his most recent work . . . . 
S.C. Com, ANN. § 41-35-120(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1983). 
The Supreme Court of South Carolina has held that the words "good cause" mean, in most 
cases, a cause connected with the claimant's employment. Sherbert v. Verner, 240 S.C. 286, 
125 S.E.2d 737 (1962), revd on other grounds, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Stone Mfg. Co. v. South 
Carolina Employment Sec. Comm.n., 219 S.C. 239, 64 S.E.2d 644 (1951). 
The S.C.E.S.C. took the position that pregnancy was to be considered a voluntary resigna-
tion unrelated to employment and therefore grounds for disqualification. This policy does not 
appear in the South Carolina statute itself, but was set forth in official S.C.E.S.C. guidelines. 
The relevant portions read: 
2. Any individual who voluntarily leaves her most recent work because of pregnancy is 
subject to the same disqualification provision of . . . the South Carolina Employment 
Security Law as any other individual who voluntarily leaves for a personal reason not 
attributable to the employment. 
3. An individual who is separated by the employer because of pregnancy will not be 
subject to a disqualification period under ... the Law. 
4. A claimant who is separated from an employer because of a policy which provides for 
separation of a woman worker after a certain stage of pregnancy will not be subject to any 
disqualification under ... the Law. 
5. If an individual accepts a maternity leave of absence for a definite period, the Com-
mission's policy governing leaves of absence will be followed if a claim is filed prior to the 
expiration thereof or after the claimant does not report back for duty. , 
S.C.E.S.C. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION INSTRUCTIONS M-135 (Oct. 16, 1972), quoted in 
Porcher, 502 F. Supp. at 950-51. Another such publication cited pregnancy as an example of 
personal reasons which did not constitute good cause: 
The South Carolina Employment Security Law provides in Section 41-35-120(1) that if 
the Commission finds that a claimant voluntarily left his most recent employment without 
good cause, such claimant shall be ineligible for benefits from the effective date of the 
claim and continuing until he has performed services in covered employment . . . . The 
South Carolina Supreme Court has interpreted the words "good cause" to mean a cause 
attributable to or connected with the claimant's employment. Personal reasons, therefore, 
do not constitute good cause for quitting. Examples of such personal reasons are as 
follows: 
(d) Due to Pregnancy. 
The individual who quits because he [sic] is dissatisfied with his job or for personal rea-
sons as stated above will be disqualified for quitting without good cause. 
S.C.E.S.C. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BULLETIN No. 236 (Nov. 1977), quoted in 
Porcher, 502 F. Supp. at 951. 
50. Brief for Appellees, supra note 48, at 10; Porcher, 502 F. Supp. at 953. The plaintiffs' 
claim involved only those women who were actively seeking work during or shortly after preg-
nancy. It did not address the claims of women who were unavailable for employment or 
unable to work during pregnancy. See Brief In Opposition To Certiorari at 2, Porcher v. 
Brown, 459 U.S. 1150 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Brief In Opposition To Certiorari] (denial of 
certiorari); Brief for Appellees, supra note 48, at I n.1. 
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for the fact that they left work because of pregnancy, would be al-
lowed to receive benefits. 51 
The South Carolina Employment Security Commission 
(S.C.E.S.C.) officials named as defendants in the suit maintained 
that the state did not deny compensation solely on the basis of preg-
nancy because it treated pregnancy like any other medical condition 
unrelated to employment.52 Under this view, section 3304(a)(12) pro-
hibits the state from singling out pregnancy for disfavorable treat-
ment, but as long as pregnancy is not an exclusive category for 
determining ineligibility for benefits, the requirements of section 
3304(a)(12) are satisfied.53 Further, the Commission contended that 
South Carolina was not in violation of FUTA because it followed 
the interpretation advanced by the Department of Labor, which had 
repeatedly certified South Carolina's plan.54 
The district court held that South Carolina's policy of denying 
51. The plaintiffs argued that the statutory language "solely on the basis of pregnancy," see 
text at note 46 supra, was used precisely to prevent states from denying benefits to women who 
are unemployed because they left work due to pregnancy. See Brief In Opposition To Certio-
rari, supra note 50, at 3-4. 
52. Brief for Appellants at 10-14, Brown v. Porcher, 660 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1981) [herein-
after cited as Brief for Appellants). 
In support of its position, the S.C.E.S.C. pointed out that some pregnancy-related claims 
were paid: for example, if an employer fired a woman because of pregnancy. The commission 
contended that if claims were being denied solely on the basis of pregnancy, then no preg-
nancy-related claims would have been paid. Id. at 13. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 
however, essentially makes it unlawful to discharge an employee because of pregnancy. 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(I), 2000e(k) (1982). Thus, as a practical matter, the S.C.E.S.C.'s policy of 
denying pregnancy-related claims extended to most women who would presumably be covered 
by 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12). 
Despite the S.C.E.S.C. contention that some pregnancy-related claims were paid, the dis-
trict court in Porcher determined that for all practical purposes all cases involving pregnant 
women were subject to the same policy of disqualification. The court cited many examples of 
pregnant women who were discharged from employment or separated because their work in-
volved health hazards and who were denied compensation under South Carolina's policy. 502 
F. Supp. at 951 & n.10. 
53. The United States argued that "[u]se of the word 'solely' indicates that Congress meant 
to ban only those state laws that single out pregnancy for disadvantageous treatment.'' Amicus 
Curiae Brief, supra note 10, at 8. Under this interpretation a plan that treated pregnancy as 
any other medical condition would satisfy the FUTA requirements. 
54. On October 31, 1979, pursuant to § 3304(c), the Secretary of Labor certified South 
Carolina's unemployment compensation plan as being in compliance with FUTA. Brief for 
Appellants, supra note 52, at 24 (citing Joint Appendix at 123-26, Porcher v. Brown, 660 F,2d 
1001 (4th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Joint App.]). 
Although the Department of Labor did not formally announce its interpretation of 
§ 3304(a)(l2), during the Porcher case the S.C.E.S.C. submitted a letter at trial discussing the 
Department's interpretation. In its letter to the S.C.E.S.C., the Department of Labor main-
tained that "[a]s long as a State is determining eligibility of pregnant claimants under the State 
law in the same manner as it is determining the eligibility of other claimants . . . that State 
law so applied is consistent with 3304(a)(l2), FUTA.'' Joint App., supra note 54, at 131. 
Neither court in Porcher afforded the letter great evidentiary weight. 660 F.2d at 1004-05; 502 
F. Supp. at 957 n.20. However, the letter can be seen as representing the Labor Department's 
continued understanding of§ 3304(a)(l2). The Solicitor General, in his brief for the United 
States as amicus curiae, relied on the letter as evidence of the Labor Department's interpreta-
tion. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 10, at 12-13. 
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benefits to otherwise eligible workers because they left their last em-
ployment for medical reasons associated with pregnancy violated the 
Federal Act.55 The court maintained that receipt of unemployment 
benefits by a woman actively seeking work after childbirth should 
not be subject to the whim and calculations of the employer. Rather, 
FUTA requires respect for an individualized medical decision that a 
pregnant woman must stop work to avoid job-related exposure to 
health hazards or to attend to the biological imperatives of child-
birth. 56 The court accepted the plaintiffs' interpretation of section 
33O4(a)(l2), noting that "[i]n plain, unambiguous language, Con-
gress imposed a sweeping ban on the use of pregnancy or its termi-
nation as an excuse for denying benefits to otherwise eligible 
women."57 
The Fourth Circuit, on appeal, affirmed the district court's hold-
ing.58 The circuit court also found the statutory mandate to be clear 
and unambiguous: "[R]egardless of how the Commission treats em-
ployees with other disabilities, . . . [it] cannot deny compensation 
'solely on the basis of pregnancy or termination of pregnancy.' "59 
The court stated that the Secretary's certification of South Carolina's 
law was "neither controlling nor entitled to great weight," noting 
that the allegedly offensive practice did not appear on the face of the 
law.60 Thus, the court believed that the Secretary's certification may 
have been a summary approval of the statutory language without 
examination of actual state practice. 
The S.C.E.S.C. applied to the United States Supreme Court for 
relief from the decision below.61 The Supreme Court denied certio-
rari.62 Justice White, joined by two other justices, wrote a sharp dis-
sent. Justice White maintained that the direct conflict between the 
Department of Labor's position and the Fourth Circuit's holding 
represents, at a minimum, the existence of substantial uncertainty in 
an area of great practical significance to the states, the Department 
of Labor and large numbers of pregnant women.63 
55. The district court expressly stated that "[t]he policies and practices of the South Caro-
lina Employment Security Commission are declared to be in direct contravention of26 U.S.C. 
§ 3304(a)(l2)." 502 F. Supp. at 958. In so holding, the court found it unnecessary to consider 
constitutional claims raised by the plaintiffs. 502 F. Supp. at 958 n.22. 
56. 502 F. Supp. at 957. 
57. 502 F. Supp. at 955 (emphasis omitted). 
58. 660 F.2d at 1007. The Fourth Circuit, however, modified the judgment with respect to 
the individual awards. The case was then remanded for further proceedings consistent with 
the circuit court's opinion. 
59. 660 F.2d at 1004. 
60. 660 F.2d at 1004. 
61. Porcher v. Brown,pelilionfar cert.filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3882 (U.S. May 16, 1982) (No. 81-
1972). 
62. Porcher v. Brown, 459 U.S. 1150 (1983). 
63. Justice White,joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist, th'?ught three major aspects of 
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III. STATUTORY ANALYSIS 
A. Weight to he Accorded the Secretary of Labor's Certification of 
Plans that Group Pregnancy with Other Medical 
Conditions 
Ordinarily, the process of interpreting a statutory provision be-
gins with the language itself,64 read with reference to applicable ca-
nons of statutory construction.65 In conjunction with the canons, it is 
usually considered appropriate to consult the legislative history66 for 
insight into the intended meaning of the words chosen by the legisla-
the Porcher decision deserved consideration: (1) the conflicting interpretations of§ 3304(a)(l2) 
advanced by the Secretary of Labor and the Fourth Circuit; (2) the relevance of the eleventh 
amendment to the decision; and (3) the availability ofa cause of action under42 U.S.C. § 1983 
to redress the state's failure to comply with§ 3304(a)(l2). 459 U.S. at 1151-54. 
64. See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 339 (1971) ("Not wishing 'to give point to 
the quip that only when legislative history is doubtful do you go to the statute; we begin by 
looking to the text itself.' ") ( citing Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 
CoLUM. L. REv. 527,543 (1947)); March v. United States, 506 F.2d 1306, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 1974) 
("When a court construes a statute, the starting point must be the language of the statute."); 
GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 716 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972) ("We 
are well aware of the first catechism of statutory construction which teaches that we should 
begin the process of interpretation with 'the language of the statute itself.'") (citing Jones v. 
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 420 (1968)). 
65. See, e.g., Irons v. Diamond, 670 F.2d 265, 269 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("Whether Con-
gress so intended, of course, is a question of statutory interpretation to be resolved by reference 
to the language of the statute, its legislative history, and the canons of statutory construction.''); 
In re Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 658 F.2d 1149, 1157 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 
1000 (1982) ("In reaching this conclusion, we must reference appropriate canons and maxims 
- of statutory construction . . . ."). 
66. See, e.g., District of Columbia Natl. Bank v. District of Columbia, 348 F.2d 808, 810 
(D.C. Cir. 1965) ("And since the judicial function is to ascertain the legislative intention the 
Court may properly exercise that function with recourse to the legislative history . . . .''); 
United States v. Hepp, 497 F. Supp. 348, 349 (N.D. Iowa 1980), affd., 656 F.2d 350 (1981) 
("[E]ven though the statute appears clear on its face, inquiry must not stop there, but rather the 
court must also examine the statutory scheme and legislative history . . . .''). It is often stated, 
however, that resort to the legislative history is appropriate only when the words of the statute 
are ambiguous. See, e.g., Central Trust Co. v. Official Creditors Comm., 454 U.S. 354, 359-60 
(1982) ("It is elementary that the meaning of the statute must, in the first instance, be sought in 
the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain ... the sole function of the courts 
is to enforce it according to its terms.") (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,485 
(1917)); Albright v. United States, 631 F.2d 915,918 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("If the language is clear 
and unambiguous, a court must give effect to its plain meaning.'') (citations omitted). Other 
courts recognize, however, that words are rarely so clear so as to be subject to only one mean-
ing. See, e.g., Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 157 (1972) ("But, while the 
clear meaning of statutory language is not to be ignored, 'words are inexact tools at best,' and 
hence it is essential that we place the words of a statute in their proper context by resort to the 
legislative history.") (quoting Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476,479 (1943)); Free-
man v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 505 F.2d 527, 533 n.17 (7th Cir. 1974) ("But words are 
inexact tools at best, and for that reason there is wisely no rule of law forbidding resort to 
legislative history no matter how 'clear the words may appear on "superficial examina-
tion."'") (quoting Harrison, 317 U.S. 479 (1943)). In any event, any claim that§ 3304(a)(l2) 
is unambiguous on its face is academic given that the department charged with its administra-
tion and the Fourth Circuit subscribed to divergent interpretations of the section. Cf. GAF 
Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 716 n.14 (2d Cir. 1971) (meaning of term not considered plain 
when judges in two recent cases did not agree on meaning), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972). 
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ture.67 By charging the Department of Labor with the administra-
tion of the provision, however, the framework of FUTA requires a 
reviewing court to start at a different point. The court must begin by 
ascertaining the proper weight to attach to the position taken by the 
Secretary, as representative of the charged department.68 If, for ex-
ample, the Secretary's :findings should be considered conclusive by 
law, then the practical significance of investigating alternative inter-
pretations is diminished. As a general proposition, many courts state 
that interpretation of a statute by an agency entrusted with its imple-
mentation is entitled to great weight.69 This rule, however, is infre-
quently applied in the absolute.7° For example, the general rule is 
often qualified to read that the agency's interpretation is to be up-
held absent "compelling indications that it is wrong"71 or evidence 
67. See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 420 (1973) ("[W]ords generally have 
different shades of meaning, and are to be construed if reasonably possible to effectuate the 
intent of the lawmakers .•.. ") (quoting Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 258 (1937)); 
Colorado Pub. Interest Group, Inc., v. Train, 507 F.2d 743, 746 (10th Cir. 1974), revd. on other 
grounds, 426 U.S. 1 (1975) ("It is a basic rule of statutory construction that statutes are to be 
construed in a manner so as to effectuate the intent of the enacting body . . . ."). 
68. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a), (c) (1982). See note 52 supra. FUTA provides for judicial review 
in 26 U.S.C. § 3310 (1982). Section 3310(a) indicates that any state denied certification by the 
Secretary may file for review in the United States Court of Appeals. Section 3310(c) autho-
rizes the court to set aside or affirm the Secretary's actions. 
69. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) (" 'The administrative 
interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency ... [is] entitled to great deference.'") (quot-
ing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971)); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 
367-68 (1974) (" 'When faced with a problem of statutory construction, this Court shows great 
deference to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its 
administration.'") (quoting Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965)); Hamilton v. Butz, 520 
F.2d 709, 714 (9th Cir. 1975) ("Courts accord 'great weight' only to the interpretations given a 
statute by the agency charged with the statute's administration.''); Budd Co. v. OSHA, 513 
F.2d 201,204 (3d Cir. 1975) (per curiam) ("In dealing with questions regarding the interpreta-
tion of statutes or regulations . . . committed to a federal administrative agency . . . federal 
courts are obliged to accord 'great deference' to the agency's construction . . . .''). See gener-
ally 5 B. MEZINES, J. STEIN & J. GRUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 51.01 (1983) (discussion of 
judicial review of findings of law and fact). 
70. See, e.g., FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive, 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965) (although Commission's 
judgment is entitled to great weight, in the last analysis the legal standard is a matter of judi-
cial construction); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 (1945) (reviewing 
courts need not merely accept Board's conclusions); Thompson v. Clifford, 408 F.2d 154, 167 
(D.C. Cir. 1968) ("Administrative construction is less potent ... where it does not rest upon 
matters peculiarly within the administrator's field of expertise."). But see Morris v. Gressette, 
432 U.S. 491, 504-05 (1977) (Congress authorized the Attorney General to perform a 
preclearance review of a state's voting laws under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act as an "expedi-
tious alternative to declaratory judgment actions," and since '1udicial review of the Attorney 
General's actions would unavoidably extend this period, it is necessarily precluded.''). 
71. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969) (''This principle is given 
special force by the equally venerable principle that the construction of a statute by those 
charged with its execution should be followed unless there are compelling indications that it is 
wrong . . . .''). This language from Red Lion has been quoted frequently. See, e.g., New 
York State Dept. of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405,421 (1973); Columbia Broadcasting 
Sys. v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 121 (1973); Ute Indian Tribe v. Probst, 428 F.2d 
491, 497 (10th Cir. 1970). 
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that it is "plainly erroneous"72 or "clearly wrong."73 
In instances in which the statutory grant of power to an agency is 
very broad or confers a wide degree of discretion, the courts are 
more likely to defer to agency determination.74 Courts have af-
forded great deference in cases involving a charged agency's initial 
interpretation of an undefined central statutory term..75 Similarly, if 
the agency has interpreted a provision in the same manner for many 
years, the courts are normally reluctant to substitute their own judg-
ment.76 This is especially true when Congress has reenacted the leg-
islation with no attempt to modify agency practice. 77 
In cases in which the statutory language is relatively precise, yet 
still allows for some agency discretion, courts tend to examine the 
72. United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872 (1977) (" '[T]he ultimate criterion is the 
administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly errone-
ous or inconsistent with the regulation.'") (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 
U.S. 410, 414 (1945)); Beatty v. Schweiker, 678 F.2d 359, 360 (3d Cir. 1982) ("Indeed, we will 
uphold the Secretary's interpretation of the regulations 'unless it is plainly erroneous or incon-
sistent with the regulation[s).' ") (quoting Bowles, 325 U.S. at 414). 
73. Stevens v. Commissioner, 452 F.2d 741, 746 (9th Cir. 1971) ("As the agency charged 
. . . Interior's interpretation is entitled to 'great weight' and 'is not to be overturned unless 
clearly wrong .... '")(quoting United States v. Jackson, 280 U.S. 183, 193 (1930)); see also 
R. V. McGinnis Theatres & Pay T.V., Inc. v. Video Indep. Theatres, Inc., 386 F.2d 592, 594 
(10th Cir. 1967) (if administrative construction of a statute is clearly wrong, it is the duty of the 
court to so find). 
74. See, e.g., Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425-26 (1977) (express delegation to Secre-
tary of power to prescribe regulations); Norwegian Nitrogen Prod. Co. v. United States, 288 
U.S. 294, 315 (1933) (Tariff Commission authorized to adopt such reasonable procedures, rules 
and regulations as it may deem necessary); Santise v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d 925, 933 (3d Cir. 
1982) ("Secretary is accorded full power to make rules and regulations and to establish 
procedures"). 
75. See, e.g., Unemployment Compensation Commn. v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153 (1946) 
(definition oflabor dispute in "active progress"); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 
111, 131 (1944) (definition of term "employee"). 
76. See, e.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 18 (1965) (" 'It therefore comes within the rule 
that the practical construction given to an act of Congress ... by those charged ... is entitled 
to great respect and, if acted upon for a number of years, will not be disturbed except for 
cogent reasons.'") (quoting McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U.S. 477, 480-81 (1921)); Universal 
Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 580,583 (1930) (''This construction of those terms has 
been adhered to in the Internal Revenue Bureau for about ten years and it ought not to be 
disturbed now unless it be plainly wrong."); West v. Bergland, 611 F.2d 710, 720-21 (8th Cir. 
1979) (''The substance of the current regulation and its predecessor . . . has been in effect for 
about thirty years . . . . Absent 'compelling indications' that the Secretary is wrong, his long-
standing interpretation ... is entitled to great deference."). 
77. See, e.g., United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 n.10 (1979) (When "an 
agency's statutory construction has been 'fully brought to the attention of the public and Con-
gress,' and the latter has not sought to alter that interpretation although it has amended the 
statute in other respects, then presumably the legislative intent has been correctly discerned.") 
(quoting Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489 (1940)); Board of Governors of the 
Fed. Res. Sys. v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U.S. 234, 248-49 (1978) ("[A]n agency's long-
standing construction of its statutory mandate is entitled to great respect, 'especially when 
Congress has refused to alter [ ... ) construction.'") (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. 
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969)). But cf. March v. United States, 506 F.2d 1306, 1315 n.37 
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (when meaning of statute is plain, subsequent reenactment does not signify 
adoption of administrative construction). 
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agency's determinations with greater scrutiny.78 The Supreme 
Court's decision in Skidmore v. Sw!ft & Co.79 indicates that courts 
are to evaluate the action of a charged agency by taking into consid-
eration all factors which affect the persuasiveness of the agency's 
conclusion.80 In particular, courts in such cases frequently examine 
agency action for its compatibility with congressional purpose. The 
Supreme Court has stated on several occasions that reviewing courts 
are not required to accept agency decisions that are plainly inconsis-
tent with legislative intent or policy,81 especially when such policy 
has been clearly articulated. 82 
In the specific case of section 33O4(a)(l2), the Secretary must de-
termine if the state is denying benefits "solely on the basis of preg-
nancy."83 On the whole, this language is relatively straightforward. 
The only term that could reasonably be subject to more than one 
contextual interpretation is the word "solely."84 Because "solely" is 
not one of the key definitional phrases under the statute and the Sec-
retary's interpretation is relatively recent, adherence to the general 
78. See United States v. Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 799 (1969) (statute imprecise in dif-
ferentiating a "drug" from a "device"; therefore, Secretary's interpretation upheld as reason-
able in light of statutory purpose); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944) (case-by-
case determinations by the administrator as to whether waiting time was working time under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act entitled to some deference because of experience and knowledge 
accumulated in the course of his duties). 
79. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
80. 323 U.S. at 140. (''The weight of such [an agency] judgment in a particular case will 
depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its 
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to 
persuade, if lacking power to control."). The Swift standard for evaluating agency action has 
been quoted frequently. See, e.g., Federal Maritime Bd. v. Ibrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481, 499-
500 (1958); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,903 n.7 (11th Cir. 1982); Mercy Hosp. & 
Medical Center v. Harris, 625 F.2d 905, 907 (9th Cir. 1980); Usery v. Columbia Univ., 568 
F.2d 953, 963 n.4 (2d Cir. 1977). 
81. See Espinosa v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973) (''The Commission's more 
recent interpretation of the statute ... is no doubt entitled to great deference, but that defer-
ence must have limits where, as here, application of the guideline would be inconsistent with 
an obvious congressional intent .... ") (citation omitted); Volkwagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft 
v. FMC, 390 U.S. 261, 272 (1968) ("But the courts are the final authorities on issues of statu-
tory construction . . . and 'are not obliged to stand aside and rubber-stamp their affirmance of 
administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate 
the congressional policy underlying a statute.'") (quoting NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291 
(1965)). 
82. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 165-66 (1941) ("As a standard, the 
Board must comply also with the requirement that the unit selected must be one to effectuate 
the policy of the act . . . . Where the policy of an act is so definitely and elaborately stated, 
this requirement acts as a permitted measure of delegated authority.''). 
83. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12) (1982). 
84. The district court in Brown v. Porcher, 502 F. Supp. 946, 955 (D.S.C. 1980), modffied 
and remanded, 660 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1150 (1983), found that the 
statute unambiguously prohibited the use of pregnancy to deny benefits to otherwise eligible 
women. See text at note 57 supra. The Fourth Circuit, affirming the district court's decision, 
believed that the statute was so clear on its face that resort to the legislative history was unnec-
essary. 660 F.2d at 1004. 
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rule granting the charged agency's determination great deference is 
unnecessary. In addition, reviewing courts need not afford great def-
erence to an agency's interpretation of statutory language if con-
struction of that language does not require experience or expertise 
peculiar to the charged agency.85 Thus, although the Secretary's in-
terpretation is to be taken into consideration, it should not be viewed 
as dispositive. This conclusion is consistent with the principle that 
statutory construction is properly a function of the judicial branch. 86 
Administration or implementation of a statute may be vested in an 
agency, but in the final analysis, the courts have the power to inter-
pret statutory enactments. Because certification by the Secretary of 
Labor of state plans that group pregnancy with other medical condi-
tions is not necessarily dispositive, analysis of section 3304(a)(12) re-
quires attention to the standard means of statutory interpretation. 87 
B. The Language of Section 3304(a)(l2) 
Congressional intent in enacting section 3304(a)(12) must be de-
termined in the context of the issues considered by Congress. At the 
time of the introduction of the bills that became the 1976 amend-
ments to FUTA, several claims of pregnancy-related sex discrimina-
tion in employment were pending in the federal courts. 88 Of 
particular relevance is Turner v. .Department of Employment Secu-
rity. 89 In Turner, the Utah Supreme Court upheld a state statute 
85. SeeTown of Brookline v. Gorsuch, 667 F.2d 215,220 (1st Cir. 1981); Brennan v. Gen-
eral Tel. Co., 488 F.2d 157, 160 (5th Cir. 1973). 
86. See FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive, 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965) ("[W]hile informed judicial 
determination is dependent upon enlightenment gained from administrative experience, in the 
last analysis the words 'deceptive practices' set forth a legal standard and they must get their 
final meaning from judicial construction."); Young v. AAA Realty Co., 350 F. Supp. 1382, 
1385 (M.D.N.C. 1972) ("Administrative interpretations of statutes are not to be followed in 
every instance, but are only helpful guides to aid the courts in their task of statutory construc-
tion. The ultimate authorities on issues of statutory interpretation are the courts.") (citations 
omitted). 
87. See generally2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION§ 45 (C. Sands 4th ed. 
1973). See also notes 64-67 supra and accompanying text. 
88. See, e.g., Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Dept. ofWater and Power, 553 F.2d 581 (9th 
Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (pension plan contributions); Satty v. 
Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975), qffd in part, vacated in part and remanded, 434 
U.S. 136 (1977) (maternity leave and seniority accumulation); Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 
519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), revd, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (exclusion of pregnancy from employer 
disability insurance plans) (overruled by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982)). During the 1970's, 
increased participation by women accounted for 60% of the growth of the country's work force. 
CENSUS BUREAU, MONEY INCOME, supra note 2, at 3. The biggest increase was recorded for 
women within the peak childbearing years - from ages 25 to 34. S. KAMERMAN, supra note 4, 
at 7. This influx of women into the labor force was accompanied by an increase in litigation 
challenging employment practices that allegedly discriminated on the basis of sex. See gener-
ally Cook, The Burger Court and Women's Rights 1971-1977, and Ginsburg, Women, Men, and 
the Constitution: Key Supreme Court Rulings, in NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, Pun. 
No. R0037, WOMEN IN THE CouRTS 21-46, 47-83 (1978) (discussing judicial trends in deci-
sions affecting the rights of women). 
89. 531 P.2d 870 (Utah), vacated and remanded per curiam, 423 U.S. 44 (1975). 
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which conclusively presumed pregnant women to be incapacitated 
and therefore ineligible for unemployment compensation for a pe-
riod before and after giving birth.90 One month after the introduc-
tion of the 1976 amendments,91 the United States Supreme Court 
vacated and remanded on the ground that the provision did not sat-
isfy the substantive due process requirements of the fourteenth 
amendment.92 Those who argue that Congress meant to ban only 
state laws that single out pregnancy as a criterion for denying bene-
fits contend that section 3304(a)(12) was a response to the Turner 
case and merely codifies the Turner result in striking down presump-
tions based on pregnancy. However, an examination of the language 
of the statute, applicable canons of construction and the legislative 
history leads to the conclusion that Congress had more than this nar-
row purpose in mind. 
Section 3304(a)(l2) prohibits disbursement of federal funds to 
states that deny benefits "solely on the basis of pregnancy or termi-
nation of pregnancy." The word "solely," given its plain and ordi-
nary definition, means "to the exclusion of all else."93 Section 
3304(a)(l2), then, forbids disqualification from being determined on 
the basis of pregnancy alone. This literal reading unfortunately does 
little to resolve the issue of proper application of the provision. The 
section is still open to the two divergent constructions argued in 
Porcher, 94 but the language used and the structure of the statute sup-
port the conclusion that Congress intended to prohibit the use of 
pregnancy as a determinative factor in denying unemployment 
benefits. 
The language of section 3304(a)(12) is very broad.95 If Congress 
90. 531 P.2d at 871. The Utah statute at issue, UTAH CooE ANN.§ 35-4-5, U.C.A. 1953 
(Repl. 46), deemed a woman leaving work ineligible for benefits for 12 weeks before and 6 
weeks after childbirth. 531 P.2d at 870. 
91. H.R. 10210 was introduced in October 1975. H.R. 10210, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). 
The Supreme Court handed down its decision in Turner in November 1975. 
92. The Court reasoned that presumptive disability for purposes of unemployment com-
pensation suffered from the same constitutional infirmity as mandatory maternity leave provi-
sions. Two years earlier in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1973), the Court 
had decided that a policy prohibiting school teachers from working for a period before and 
after childbirth violated the due process clause on the ground that the Constitution requires a 
more individualized determination of physical capacity. In Turner, the Court concluded that 
The presumption of incapacity and unavailability for employment created by the chal-
lenged provision is virtually identical to the presumption found unconstitutional in Cleve-
land Board of Education v. LaF/eur . . . . 
... The Fourteenth Amendment requires that unemployment compensation boards 
no less than school boards must achieve legitimate state ends through more individualized 
means when basic human liberties are at stake. 
423 U.S. at 46 (citation omitted). 
93. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1097 (8th ed. 1980); see also Reply of Re-
spondents to Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3, Porcher v. Brown, 459 U.S. 
1150 (1983) (denial of certiorari) (citing Webster's). 
94. See notes 50-53 supra and accompanying text. 
95. See text at note 46 supra. 
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had intended merely to codify the Turner result or, for that matter, to 
ban presumptive disability periods of any length, it could easily have 
stated that such presumptive disability periods were to be prohibited. 
There would have been no need to resort to such general language to 
remedy a specific problem.96 
In addition, Congress changed the language of the section that 
eventually became section 3304(a)(l2) between the introduction of 
the bills and the final adoption of the statute. The original draft pro-
posed that the states be prohibited from denying compensation 
"solely on the basis of pregnancy" and from determining voluntary 
termination, availability, active search for work and refusal of work 
"in a manner which discriminat[ed] on the basis of pregnancy."97 
The version that was eventually codified eliminated most of the ex-
pository language, retaining only the portion that prohibited denial 
of benefits "solely on the basis of pregnancy or termination of 
pregnancy."98 
As a matter of statutory construction, a change in the words used 
from one draft to the next is generally assumed to be by design.99 
Here the excluded clause disallowed evaluation of the ordinary eligi-
bility criteria100 in a way which prejudicially considered pregnancy. 
The legislative history contains no express indication of the reasons 
why section 3304(a)(12) was modified. However, if the intent was to 
create a statute that merely prohibited differentiation between preg-
nancy and other medical conditions, then the language relating to 
96. The Fourth Circuit in Porcher rejected the S.C.E.S.C.'s argument that Congress, in 
enacting § 3304(a)(12), sought to eliminate Turner-type statutes that contained shorter periods 
of presumptive disability. The circuit court maintained that 
[i]f Congress had intended, as the Commission argues, only to codify the Turner decision 
and take the additional step of barring discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, it could 
easily have drafted a statute reflecting those limited purposes. Instead, it broadly pro-
vided that "[n]o person shall be denied compensation under ... state law solely on the 
basis of pregnancy or termination of pregnancy." 
660 F.2d at 1004 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(l2) (1982)). 
97. The provision in the 1975 Bill reads: 
No person shall be denied compensation solely on the basis of pregnancy and determina-
tions under any provision of such State law relating to voluntary termination of employ-
ment, availability for work, active search for work, or refusal to accept work shall not be 
made in a manner which discriminates on the basis of pregnancy. 
S. 2079, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(a) (1975); H.R. 8366, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(a) (1975), 
98. H.R. 10210, 94th Cong., !st Sess. 312 (1975), cited in H.R. REP. No. 755, supra note 42, 
at 66. 
99. Cf. Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 392-93 (1980) ("Few 
principles of statutory construction are more compelling than the proposition that Congress 
does not intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded in favor of 
other language.''); Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S. 327, 337 (1930) ("The deliberate selection of 
language so differing from that used in the earlier Acts indicates that a change of law was 
intended."); Klein v. Republic Steel Corp., 435 F.2d 762, 765-66 (3d Cir. 1970) ("It is a canon 
of statutory construction that where as here the words of a later statute differ from those of a 
previous one on the same or a related subject, the legislature must have intended them to have 
a different meaning.''). 
100. See notes 21-24 supra and accompanying text. 
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discriminatory consideration of the various factors would have been 
extremely relevant. Instead, that language was discarded between 
bills without any recorded debate. In addition, Congress certainly 
was not unaware of the possibility of grouping pregnancy with other 
disabilities and, when so disposed, was able to spell out clearly that 
intent. 101 
As a general proposition, when Congress alters and then codifies 
a section, it intends the clause to be interpreted in a manner consis-
tent with the general tenor of the statute as a whole. 102 The intro-
ductory remarks at the hearings on the first draft of the 1976 
amendments evinced congressional intent to improve the unemploy-
ment compensation system in order to provide a better source of pro-
tection for the nation's workers, 103 a goal consistent with both the 
general aims of FUTA 104 and the trend toward expansion off ederal 
coverage. 105 The codified version of section 3304(a)(l2) must be 
read in light of these remedial purposes, 106 which weigh against any 
presumption that Congress altered the section to limit its application. 
Generally, courts have taken the position that remedial legislation is 
to be liberally construed 107 and any exceptions to such legislation 
narrowly interpreted. 108 In particular, it has been stated that a re-
101. Two years after § 3304(a)(l2) was adopted, Congress amended the Federal Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act to state explicitly that ''women affected by pregnancy, child-
birth, or related medical conditions shall be treated for all employment-related purposes . . . 
as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work." Pub. L. 95-
555, § I, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982)). 
102. The unchanged sections and the amendment must generally be given "the most har-
monious comprehensive meaning possible ...• To do otherwise would be to impute to Con-
gress a purpose to paralyze with one hand what it sought to promote with the other." Clark v. 
Uebersee Finanz-Korp., 332 U.S. 480, 488-89 (1947); see also Markham v. Cabell, 326 U.S. 
404,411 (1945); 2A J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 87, at§§ 22.35, 46.05. 
103. See Phase Ill: Proposed Changes in the Permanent Federal-State Unemployment Com-
pensation Programs, Before the Subcomm. on Unemployment Compensation of the Comm. on 
Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1975) (statement of James Corman, Chairman, Sub-
comm. on Unemployment Compensation). 
104. See notes 35-38 supra and accompanying text. 
105. See notes 39-43 supra and accompanying text. 
106. Remedial statutes are generally those which afford or improve remedies and those 
which correct defects in civil institutions and state administration. Modern social legislation is 
generally characterized as remedial. See 2A J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 87, at§ 60.02. 
107. See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332,336 (1967) ("In addition, we are guided 
by the familiar canon of statutory construction that remedial legislation should be construed 
broadly to effectuate its purposes."); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 
533 (1967) ("[T]his view ... seems compelled by the language of the present statute, which is 
remedial and to be liberally construed."). 
108. See, e.g., A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945) (in referring to the 
Fair Labor Standards Act, the Court stated: "Any exemption from such humanitarian and 
remedial legislation must therefore be narrowly construed .•.. "); Orzel v. City of Wauwa-
tosa Fire Dept., 697 F.2d 743, 748 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 484 (1983) (stating that 
exceptions to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act should be narrowly interpreted "be-
cause of the general maxim that exceptions to a remedial statute are to be 'narrowly and 
strictly construed.'") (quoting Sexton v. Beatrice Foods Co., 630 F.2d 478, 486 (7th Cir. 1980)). 
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strictive interpretation of the reach of federal statutes governing un-
employment compensation would violate the broad purposes of the 
federal legislation. 1o9 
The position of section 3304(a)(l2) in the overall structure of the 
109. See Henry Broderick, Inc. v. Squire, 163 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1947). The Ninth Circuit 
relied on the basic policies and purpose of the Social Security Act, which at the time included 
compensation for the unemployed, to hold that brokers should be classified as "independent 
contractors" rather than "employees" for purposes of social security and federal unemploy-
ment taxes: "[I]t has been consistently held that a narrow and legalistic interpretation of the 
scope of the Act here in question would not be in conformance with the broad purposes of 
federal social security legislation." 163 F.2d at 982. 
Although it is apparent that Congress intended the Federal Act to serve as a comprehensive 
remedy, it is important to note Congress' concurrent interest in preserving state responsibility 
for unemployment compensation. See New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 
566 F.2d 388, 392-93 (2d Cir. 1977), qffd, 440 U.S. 519 (1979) (upholding a state statutory 
provision permitting the payment of unemployment compensation to individuals involved in 
labor disputes). The New York Telephone Co. court attached great importance to the fact that 
Congress did not forbid payments to striking workers despite pressure to do so. It quoted from 
a 1935 committee report that accompanied the original federal unemployment compensation 
act: "Except for a few standards which are necessary to render certain that the State unem-
ployment compensation laws are genuine unemployment compensation acts and not merely 
relief measures, the States are left free to set up any unemployment compensation system they 
wish, without dictation from Washington." 566 F.2d at 392 (quoting S. REP, No. 628, 74th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1935)). The Second Circuit noted that expressed "congressional intent to 
avoid excessive intrusion into local affairs [was] entirely consistent with the doubt that existed 
at that time concerning Congress' power to enact legislation of this character without en-
croaching to an unconstitutional degree on the powers of the States." 566 F.2d at 393; see also 
Florida AFL-CIO v. Florida Dept. of Labor & Employment Sec., 504 F. Supp. 530, 532-33 
(N.D. Fla. 1980), qffd, 616 F.2d 513 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing the Supreme Court's decision in 
New York Telephone Co. for the proposition that the Social Security Act of 1935 placed great 
emphasis on state autonomy in the formulation of unemployment compensation plans). The 
legislative history accompanying the 1976 amendments reiterated congressional respect for the 
restraints that federalism places on control of unemployment compensation by the federal 
government. See, e.g., 122 CoNG. REc. H22521 (daily ed. July 19, 1976) (statement of Rep. 
Frenzel) (praising the Ways and Means Committee's restraint in not suggesting a federal bene-
fit standard). 
These concerns for federalism have a distinct practical significance when potential in-
creases in a state's financial responsibility to its citizens are at issue. See Amicus Curiae Brief, 
supra note 10, at 14 (citing Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471,484, 
492-93 (1977)). Eligibility requirements have been considered the province of the states at 
least in part because Congress and the states were concerned with the fiscal integrity of state 
plans and the possibility that states might over-extend themselves. Cf. National League of 
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851-52, 855 (1976) (tenth amendment held to be a limitation on 
federal government's power under the commerce clause to interfere in areas affecting essential 
state functions). But c.f. New Hampshire Dept. of Employment Sec. v. Marshall, 616 F.2d 240 
(1st Cir.), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 806 (1980) (upholding provision of the 1976 amendments 
to FUTA requiring states to extend coverage to state employees against tenth amendment 
attack). For a comparison of the Usery and Marshall decisions, see IS SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
381 (1981). 
The key question is what balance Congress sought to strike between preservation of state 
autonomy and federal regulation. In 1937, in Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 
(1937), the Supreme Court, interpreting the newly enacted federal unemployment statute, as-
serted that the states were to be afforded a wide range of discretion as long as they did not 
depart from those standards which Congress had deemed fundamental. 301 U.S. at 593-94. 
Congress had created a general framework of federal control by imposing a series of standards 
with which states desirous of federal aid must comply. As long as these threshold standards 
are not violated, a state is free to create any type of compensation plan it wishes, without 
jeopardizing its claim for federal funds. 301 U.S. at 593-94. See also Marshall, 616 F.2d at 246 
August 1984] Note - Unemployment Benefits and Pregnancy 1945 
statute also argues for a generous interpretation of the provision. It 
is significant that the federal guidelines prohibiting denial of benefits 
solely on the basis of pregnancy or termination of pregnancy are 
listed among the seventeen requisites for approval of state laws.110 
Courts have identified the guidelines set forth in section 3304(a) as 
the standards that Congress considered fundamental. 111 The entire 
system of federal leverage over state plans hinges on state compli-
ance with these guidelines. To construe these fundamental federal 
standards narrowly would effectively permit the states to evade the 
basic purposes of FUTA. Plans that label a woman's separation 
from work because of pregnancy as a voluntary termination of em-
ployment without good case in essence act indirectly to deny benefits 
on the basis of pregnancy, when a state clearly could not do so 
directly. 
To summarize, interpretation of the section as requiring only that 
pregnancy be treated like any other medical condition would essen-
tially read the provision as enunciating a prohibition on discrimina-
tory treatment of pregnancy. Acceptance of this interpretation 
would resurrect language expressly discarded by Congress. It is a 
basic principle of statutory construction that words of a statute are 
not to be disregarded in favor of an earlier but uncodi.fied version.112 
Further, the contention that Congress intended a broader remedy 
than one that simply prohibited the states from singling out preg-
nancy for adverse treatment is consistent with the remedial purposes 
of the 1976 amendments and of FUTA in general. 113 
C. The Legislative History 
The legislative history of the 1976 amendments and of FUTA in 
general is well documented. As the Fourth Circuit observed in 
(rejecting claim that state's option to comply with federal standards is illusory: "We do not 
agree that the carrot has become a club because rewards for conformity have increased."). 
This general relationship offederal-state control envisioned by the 1935 Act has essentially 
remained intact, except to the extent that Congress has increased federal dominion over unem-
ployment compensation plans. q: Marshall, 616 F.2d at 241; see also note 42 supra and ac-
companying text. The First Circuit added in Marshall that "We must also recognize that, 
since 1935, the philosophy and objective of the unemployment compensation program, viz., 
that unemployment is a national problem that must be dealt with on a national basis, have 
been woven into the fabric of our society." 616 F.2d at 246. 
In sum, although Congress was concerned with allowing the states latitude to control un-
employment compensation, when the fundamental federal standards of§ 3304(a) are at issue, 
the federal guidelines are to take precedence. The argument that the states should be allowed 
to experiment with plans that treat pregnancy in innovative ways is unconvincing given that 
Congress placed the prohibition against denial of benefits on the basis of pregnancy among the 
fundamental federal standards of§ 3304(a). 
110. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(l)-(17) (1982). 
11 I. See note 32 supra. 
112. See note 99 supra. 
113. See notes 34-45 supra and accompanying text. 
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Porcher, however, the legislative history of section 3304(a)(l2) itself 
is "scant."114 Neither the statute nor the available legislative history 
expressly indicates whether Congress, in using the word "solely," 
sought to ban all statutes that deny benefits on the basis of preg-
nancy or only those provisions that single out pregnancy for adverse 
treatment. Examination of the legislative history of section 
3304(a)(l2) and of FUTA in general, however, leads to the conclu-
sion that Congress meant to eliminate pregnancy as a determinative 
factor in disqualification decisions. 
One of the arguments used to support a narrow reading of sec-
tion 3304(a)(12) is that the report of the Senate Finance Committee 
on the 1976 amendments, 115 presented several months after Turner, 
specifically refers to the case. 116 It is thus apparent that Congress 
was aware of statutes, such as Utah's, which contained conclusive 
presumptions of incapacity. The Labor Department maintains that 
this evidences congressional intent to eradicate only the specific infir-
mity illustrated by the Utah statute.117 However, several considera-
tions weigh against adopting such a narrow view of congressional 
purpose. 
The passage of the Senate report that refers to the Turner deci-
sion begins by listing three requisites for qualification for unemploy-
ment compensation. A worker must demonstrate that he or she is 
114. 660 F.2d at 1004. 
115. S. REP. No. 1265, 1976 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 5997, supra note 42. The 
Committee's report is dated September 20, 1976. 
116. The report reads: 
D. Provisions Related to Benefit Eligibility Disqualification for Pregnancy 
(Sec. 302 of the Bill) 
In order to qualify for unemployment compensation benefits, a worker must be able to 
work, be seeking employment, and be available for employment. In a number of States, 
an individual whose unemployment is related to pregnancy is barred from receiving any 
unemployment benefits. In 1975 the Supreme Court found a provision of this type in the 
Utah unemployment compensation statute to be unconstitutional. The Utah requirement 
had disqualified workers for a period of 18 weeks (12 weeks before birth through 6 weeks 
after birth). The Court stated that "a conclusive presumption of incapacity during so long 
a period before and after childbirth is constitutionally invalid." A number of other States 
have similar provisions although most appear to involve somewhat shorter periods of dis-
qualification. 
The co=ittee bill includes, without modification, the provision of the House bill 
which would prohibit States from continuing to enforce any provision which denies un-
employment compensation benefits solely on the basis of pregnancy (or recency of preg-
nancy). Pregnant individuals would, however, continue to be required to meet generally 
applicable criteria of availability for work and ability to work. 
S. REP. No. 1265, at 19, 21, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 6013, 6015, 
supra note 42. 
117. The Solicitor General interpreted the above-mentioned passage from the Senate re-
port as "suggest[ing] not that Congress intended to require preferential treatment of preg-
nancy, but only that it was concerned with elimination of a variety of automatic pregnancy 
disqualification provisions contained in state laws at that time." See Amicus Curiae Brief, 
supra note 10, at 10-11. 
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able to work, is seeking work and is available for work. 118 The re-
port then describes the facts of the Turner case as an example of a 
state statute that denies compensation in cases of pregnancy-related 
unemployment.119 The implication is that three main factors are to 
be considered and that the conclusive presumption employed in 
Utah demonstrates an impermissible bypass of those factors. 120 This 
interpretation is supported by the fact that the succeeding paragraph 
concludes with a reaffirmation that "[p]regnant individuals would, 
however, continue to be required to meet generally applicable crite-
ria of availability for work and ability to work." 121 
Similarly, the House report accompanying the bill mentions, with 
apparent approval, eligibility provisions applicable to "all claimants, 
including pregnant women" that disqualify "anyone who is physi-
cally unable to work or who is unavailable for work."122 The impli-
cation is not that it is permissible to deny benefits to claimants on the 
basis of pregnancy as long as all others subject to a medical disability 
are treated the same. Rather, the standard suggests that all those 
unavailable for or unable to work are to be treated alike. The 
House's approval did not, therefore, extend to provisions which deny 
benefits to pregnant women who are able to and available for work 
or to· women who are actually seeking to return to work after giving 
birth. 
The legislative history makes several references to Turner-type 
statutes. 123 It is, however, devoid of any statement indicating that 
Congress intended merely to codify the Turner result. Thus, al-
though the Turner case focused congressional attention on the broad 
issue of denial of unemployment compensation for separation from 
work due to pregnancy, Congress did not limit its inquiry to pre-
sumptive disability.124 
118. S. REP. No. 1265 at 19, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 6013, 
supra note 42. See generally notes 21-24 supra and accompanying text (discussing general eligi-
bility criteria). 
119. S. REP. No. 1265 at 19, 21, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 6013, 
6015, supra note 42. 
120. See 122 CONG. REC. 22517, 22518 (1976) (comments of Mr. Steiger). Mr. Steiger 
emphasized that not all pregnant women would, under the proposed amendment, automati-
cally receive benefits. Pregnant women should be adjudged in terms of availability for work 
and ability to work, as are all other claimants. See also notes 21-24 supra and accompanying 
text. 
121. s. REP. No. 1265 at 21, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 6015, 
supra note 42. 
122. H.R. REP. No. 755, supra note 42, at 50. The report commented on the inequity of 
statutes that "deny benefits without regard to the woman's ability to work, availability for 
work, or efforts to find work." 
123. See H.R. REP. No. 755, supra note 42, at 50; SUBCOMMITTEE ON UNEMPLOYMENT 
COMPENSATION OF THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESS., INFORMATION 
TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 10210 12 (Comm. Print 1975). 
124. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 48, at 13. .But cf. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 
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Additional evidence that Congress did not seek merely to elimi-
nate presumptive disability clauses is contained in the report of the 
House committee that presented the bill in December of 1975.125 
The report referred to nineteen state provisions that denied benefits 
because of pregnancy.126 It did not limit examples of these provi-
sions to Turner-type violations, but delineated two major classes of 
pregnancy disqualifications: those that employed conclusive pre-
sumptions and those that disqualified women who left work because 
of pregnancy.127 
While the House report did not list the nineteen states to which it 
referred, there is some speculation 128 that the nineteen states in-
tended were those mentioned in a Labor Department Unemploy-
ment Insurance Program Letter129 one week earlier. This bulletin 
listed a variety of discriminatory state provisions relating in general 
to family obligations and to pregnancy. 
Although it is not certain why the Labor Department focused on 
these nineteen states, at a minimum there seems to be no reason to 
assume that Congress meant to alter the practices of only these 
states. Other states that did not appear on the list had promulgated 
supplementary regulations or had adopted policies that denied bene-
fits to pregnant or formerly pregnant women on similar grounds.130 
The House report stated that although the provisions varied among 
the nineteen states, all were inequitable because they denied benefits 
despite the woman's availability and attempts to secure employ-
10, at 9-11 (Congress concerned with elimination of automatic pregnancy disqualification in 
laws at that time). 
12S. H.R. REP. No. 75S, supra note 42. 
126. The relevant portion of the House Report explains: "At the present time, 19 States 
have provisions which, in effect, deny benefits because of pregnancy. They vary from State to 
State, but they are all inequitable in that they deny benefits without regard to the woman's 
ability to work, availability for work, or efforts to find work." H.R. REP. No. 75S, supra note 
42, at SO. 
127. In a section comparing the proposed provisions with those then in effect, the House 
report states: "Nineteen states have special disqualification provisions pertaining to preg-
nancy. Several of these provisions hold pregnant women unable to work and unavailable for 
work; the remainder disqualify a claimant because she left work on account of her condition or 
because her unemployment is a result of pregnancy." H.R. REP. No. 75S, supra note 42, at 7. 
128. See Brief for Appellants, supra note S2, at 18. 
129. "Su=ary of Discriminatory State Provisions Relating to Pregnancy, Domestic and 
Marital Obligations and Dependent's Allowances,'' Unemployment Insurance Program Letter 
No. 33-7S, [197S-1980 Unemployment Insurance Transfer Binder] UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) 
~ 1996 (197S) [hereinafter cited as Unemployment Insurance Program Letter]. The nineteen 
jurisdictions cited as having discriminatory pregnancy provisions were Alabama, Arkansas, 
Colorado, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Mon-
tana, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah and West 
Virginia. 
130. The prime example is South Carolina. The Porcher case involved a challenge to state 
practice. No reference to pregnancy appeared on the face of the statute. S.C. CODE. ANN, 
§ 41-3S-120(1) (Law. Co-op., 1977 and Supp. 1982). 
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ment. 131 Presumably, a similar denial of benefits in any state would 
be just as inequitable. 
The nineteen state provisions listed in the Department of Labor's 
Unemployment Insurance Letter were quite diverse in their treat-
ment of pregnancy. Some states provided for prescribed periods of 
ineligibility after return to work132 or after giving notice of a desire 
to resume work. 133 Others included presumptive periods of disabil-
ity or unavailability. 134 A few states presumed inability or unavaila-
bility until proof to the contrary was tendered. 135 If Congress were 
concerned only with presumptive disability, then only those statutes 
that employed such presumptions would have been under considera-
tion. The variety of provisions in the nineteen mentioned states sug-
gests that Congress was seeking a broader remedy. 
Thus, it appears likely that although Congress focused on pre-
sumptive disability, it elected to implement a broader remedy. Yet, 
even if Congress had intended only to eliminate presumptive disabil-
ity provisions, statutes that deny benefits to formerly pregnant wo-
men on the ground that they have voluntarily quit without good 
cause related to employment would still contravene congressional in-
tent. The basic defect inherent in presumptive disability periods, as 
indicated by the Supreme Court in Turner and implied in the com-
mittee reports accompanying the 197 6 amendments, is that presump-
tive disability clauses supplant individualized determinations of a 
claimant's ability and availability. 136 Statutes that label a woman's 
separation from work because of childbirth as a voluntary leaving 
without good cause137 merely substitute one presumption for an-
131. "Under eligibility provisions applicable to all claimants, including pregnant women, 
anyone who is physically unable to work or who is unavailable for work is ineligible for bene-
fits. These determinations are made on the basis of the facts of each individual case and make 
discriminatory disqualifications because of pregnancy unnecessary." R.R. REP. No. 755, supra 
note 42, at 50. 
132. For example, in Colorado a claimant generally was ineligible after childbirth until she 
had worked 13 weeks. If she was the sole support of a child or an invalid spouse, however, she 
was ineligible for only 30 days. In Tennessee, a woman was disqualified for 21 days after she 
was able to work. In West Virginia, the period of ineligibility ranged from 30 days after return 
to work to 6 weeks before and after, depending on the circumstances of separation. Unemploy-
ment Insurance Program Letter, supra note 129. 
133. Alabama disqualified women whose maternity leaves extended beyond ten weeks un-
less they gave three weeks notice of a desire to return to work. Id. 
134. The District of Columbia, Kansas, Montana, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Utah and 
Texas provided for varying periods of presumptive disability or unavailability. Id. All of 
these statutes are presumably unconstitutional after the Supreme Court decision in Turner. 
135. Delaware, Oregon, Maryland, Nevada and Ohio presumed disability until rebutted 
by a statement from the woman's physician or by a ruling by the program's administrator. Id. 
136. The Supreme Court in Turner held that the fourteenth amendment required the state 
to use more individualized procedures. See note 92 supra (quoting Turner, 423 U.S. at 46). 
Both the Senate and House reports accompanying what is now § 3304(a)(l2) stressed the im-
portance of individualized determinations on the basis of the criteria normally employed in 
evaluating a worker's claim. See notes 121 & 126 supra and accompanying text. 
137. See note 11 supra. 
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other. Under this type of statute, a pregnant or formerly pregnant 
woman is denied benefits without regard to the circumstances sur-
rounding her departure. Presumably, even if Congress did direct its 
inquiry at presumptive disability, statutes that contain the very infir-
mities Congress sought to remedy in a slightly altered form cannot 
be said to effe<;:tuate congressional intent. 
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
A. Pregnancy Policy and the Potential for Gender .Discrimination 
The theory that pregnancy should be afforded the same treat-
ment as that afforded any physical disability or medical condition 
originated in the 1970's in the context of employment discrimination 
claims.138 Although these claims met with varying degrees of suc-
cess, 139 a g~neral definition of the nature of pregnancy claims began 
to emerge. 
The majority of these suits involved challenges to mandatory ma-
ternity leave policies140 or to disqualification of pregnancy from em-
ployer-sponsored disability insurance plans. 141 In these cases, 
employers routinely contended that pregnancy was not an illness, 142 
but a temporary physical condition voluntarily assumed, 143 and 
therefore reasonably subject to unique treatment. 144 Most courts re-
138. Some of these suits were brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1982). See, e.g., Berg v. Richmond Unified School Dist., 528 F.2d 1208 
(9th Cir. 1975), vacated per curiam, 434 U.S. 158 (1978) (mandatory maternity leave); Gilbert 
v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), revd., 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (overruled by 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982) (enacted Oct. 31, 1978)) (pregnancy benefits); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. 
Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated, 424 U.S. 737 (1975) (pregnancy benefits and 
maternity leave). Others were based on equal protection theories brought under the fourteenth 
amendment or 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184 
(6th Cir. 1972), qffd., 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (mandatory maternity leave); Aiello v. Hansen, 359 
F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Cal. 1973), revd. sub nom. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (exclu-
sion of pregnancy from state disability plan); Bravo v. Board of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. 
ID. 1972), revd., 525 F.2d 695 (7th Cir. 1975) (mandatory maternity leave). 
139. See generally Note, The 1978 Pregnancy JJiscrimination Act: A Problem of Interpreta-
tion, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 607, 607-23 (1980) (description of state of law at time of enactment of 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982)). 
140. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Green v. Waterford 
Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973). 
141. See, e.g., Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), revd., 429 U.S. 
125 (1976) (overruled by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982) (enacted Oct. 31, 1978)); Wetzel v. Lib-
erty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated, 424 U.S. 737 (1976). 
142. See, e.g., Newman v. Delta Air Lines, 374 F. Supp. 238, 245 (N.D. Ga. 1973), qffd. per 
curiam, 415 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1973). 
143. See Gilbert v.'General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661,665 (4th Cir. 1975), revd., 429 U.S. 125 
(1976) (overruled by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982)); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 
199, 206 (3d Cir. 1975), vacatfd, 424 U.S. 737 (1976). 
144. See Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist. No. 7,519 F.2d 961, 963 (9th Cir. 1975), 
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1037 (1977); Scott v. Opelika City School, 63 F.R.D. 144, 147 (M.D. Ala. 
1974). See generally Note, Income Protection for Pregnant Workers, 26 DRAKE L. REV. 389, 
391-94 (1976) (discussing legislation and case law affecting pregnant women). 
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jected this argument on two grounds. First, the courts -recognized 
that pregnancy is not necessarily voluntary, in the ordinary sense of 
the word. 145 Second, although pregnancy is not an illness or a dis-
ease, it is a condition with similar attributes. 146 Both illness and 
pregnancy can lead to inability to work, the incurrence of medical 
expenses and a loss of income.147 
Congress has also, in some instances, equated pregnancy with 
other medical conditions. Since 1972, the Equal Opportunity Com-
mission guidelines have drawn an analogy between pregnancy and 
illness.148 More recently, Congress incorporated the correlation be-
tween sickness and pregnancy into the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act of 1978.149 Yet, it is important to note·that, despite the fact that 
pregnancy has been compared to illness, the analogy is not an exact 
one. 
Pregnancy and childbirth are different from illness in._the funda-
145. Many women cannot or will not use birth control for religious or medical reasons. 
Further, no method of birth control is 100% effective. See Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 
F.2d 199, 206 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated, 424 U.S. 737 (1976), See generally Note, Fourteenth 
Amendment: Public School Maternity Leave: Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 35 
Omo ST. L.J. 1004, 1022 & n.140 (1974) (describing documented side effects of currently avail-
able contraceptive drugs). But cf. Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 474 F.2d 395, 398 
(4th Cir. 1973), revd. sub nom. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (preg-
nancy is usually voluntary). 
146. See Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 206 (3d Ck 1975), vacated, 424 
U.S. 737 (1976); see also Note, Love's Labor Lost: New Conceptions of Maternity Leaves, 7 
HARV. C.R.-C.L.L.R. 260, 282 (1972) (listing shared characteristics of childbirth and short-
term disabilities in general). 
147. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 500-01 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (overruled by 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982) (enacted Oct. 31, 1978)); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 
199, 206 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated, 424 U.S. 737 (1976). 
148. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1984). The original 1972 version of the regulations is printed in 
37 Fed. Reg. 6835, 6837 (1972). This section reads: 
§ 1604.10 Employment policies relating to pregnancy and childbirth. 
(a) A written or unwritten employment policy or practice which excludes from employ-
ment applicants or employees because of pregnancy is in prima facie violation of title VII. 
(b) Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion, childbirth, 
and recovery therefrom are, for all job-related purposes, temporary disabilities and should 
be treated as such under any health or temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan 
available in connection with employment. Written and unwritten employment policies 
and practices involving matters such as the commencement and duration of leave, the 
availability of extensions, the accrual of seniority and other benefits and privileges, rein-
statement, and payment under any health or temporary disability insurance or sick leave 
plan, formal or informal, shall be applied to disability due to pregnancy or childbirth on 
the same terms and conditions as they are applied to other disabilities. 
(c) Where the termination of an employee who is temporarily disabled is caused by an 
employment policy under which insufficient or no leave is available, such a termination 
violates the Act if it has a disparate impact on employees of one sex and is not justified by 
business necessity. 
The guidelines in their current form contain the same language requiring employers to treat 
pregnancy-related disabilities as any health disability. The current version, however, has been 
amended to include a statement on health benefits covering abortion. Section 1604.IO(d)(l) 
was added to mandate that fringe benefit programs comply with the regulations by April 1979. 
29 C.F.R. § 1604.I0(d)(l) (1984). 
149. 42 u.s.c. § 2000e(k) (1982). 
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mental sense that our society recognizes distinct and important rights 
associated with procreation and family matters.1so Aside from the 
fundamental personal liberties that are also involved, the state has 
an acute interest in promoting survival of the species.1s1 
Furthermore, a distinguishing characteristic of pregnancy is that 
it is exclusively a female condition. Several courts1s2 and Con-
gress1s3 have acknowledged that policies relating to pregnancy and 
childbirth must be considered in light of the fact that they uniquely 
affect women. This alone does not serve to distinguish pregnancy 
from illness, since some illnesses are gender-linked.154 Nonetheless, 
it is important to recognize that policies affecting pregnant women 
potentially could be used to discriminate on the basis of sex. 
Even absent discriminatory intent, regulation of benefits on the 
basis of pregnancy may have the effect of sex discrimination.1ss The 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has stated: "Essen-
tially, the courts have found that discrimination does not occur 
solely through the conscious, intentional actions against individual 
victims, or observable, unequal treatment of different groups, but 
most pervasively through the discriminatory impact on whole classes 
of people of employment practices which may appear facially neu-
tral."1s6 Consideration of the practical consequences .flowing from 
enforcement of a statute is a relevant facet of statutory construc-
tion.1s7 Congress and the courts have endorsed a national policy to 
150. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1972) (abortion); Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (contracep-
tives); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942) (mandatory 
sterilization). 
151. See Zablocki v. Redbail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1977); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Wil-
liamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Buckley v. Coyle Pub. School Sys., 476 F.2d 92, 96 (10th 
Cir. 1973). 
152. See, e.g., Buckley v. Coyle Pub. School Sys., 476 F.2d 92, 95 (10th Cir. 1973) 
(mandatory maternity leave "penalizes feminine schoolteacher for being a woman"); Farkas v. 
Southwestern City School Dist, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 9619 (S.D. Ohio), affd. mem., 506 
F.2d 1400 (6th Cir. 1974) (failure to pay sick leave for pregnancy-related absences constitutes 
sex discrimination). But cf. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20 (1974) (validating 
state policy of excepting pregnancy from disability insurance plan on ground that program did 
not discriminate against any definable class). 
153. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982) (defining "because of sex" or "on the basis of 
sex" as including but not limited to "because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or 
related medical conditions"). 
154. See Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 338, 340 (1977). 
155. In the equal protection area, the Supreme Court has held that discriminatory impact 
may be evidence of discriminatory intent even in the case of a statute that is neutral on its face, 
See Personnel Admr. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977). 
156. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMN., ELIMINATING DISCRIMINATION 
IN EMPLOYMENT: A COMPELLING NATIONAL PRIORITY 1-1 (1979) (emphasis in original); see 
also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971). 
157. See, e.g., Hasbrouck Heights Hosp. Assn. v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 15 N.J. 
447, 453, 105 A.2d 521, 524 (1954). 
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eliminate all forms of employment discrimination.158 Interpretation 
of section 3304(a)(l2) in a way which intentionally or effectively fos-
ters sex discrimination in employment directly undercuts this impor-
tant policy. 
B. Denial of Unemployment Compensation as an Economic Barrier 
Historically, maternal benefit legislation was aimed at protecting 
the health of women and newborns. 159 In recent years, attention has 
shifted to include concern with protection of the economic contribu-
tions of women. 160 Studies have shown that not only are more wo-
men participating in the work force, 161 but that these women are 
either making a significant contribution to family income162 or are 
the sole source of it. 163 Because a pregnant woman will almost in-
variably have to leave work for some time for childbirth, 164 the 
availability of some type of income security is crucial. Women whose 
employers grant maternity leave and who return to work on a speci-
158. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMN., supra note 156, at 1-1. 
159. S. KAMERMAN, supra note 4, at 13; cf. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 
(1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) (''The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs 
to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. . . . The para-
mount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and 
mother."). 
160. S. KAMERMAN, supra note 4, at 13. 
161. During the 1970's women represented 60% of the growth in the labor force. The par-
ticipation rate of women in the labor force climbed from 43% in 1970 to 51% in 1980. CENSUS 
BUREAU, MONEY INCOME, supra note 2, at 3. 
162. See S. KAMERMAN, supra note 4, at 8. In a 1974 study, nearly two-thirds of all women 
in the work force were reported to be unmarried or married to men who earned less than 
$7,000 per year. WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, WHY WOMEN WORK (1974). Fur-
ther, the median percentage of faniily income accounted for by a working wife's earnings is 
highest when the family income is less than $3000. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. 
OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-23, No. 100, A STATISTICAL POR-
TRAIT OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES: 1978, at 79 (1980). 
163. See S. KAMERMAN, supra note 4, at 8. 
164. See LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184, 1189 (6th Cir. 1972) (Phillips, 
C.J., dissenting in part), qffd, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). In a policy statement adopted in 1974, the 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists explained: 
Pregnancy is a physiological process. All pregnant patients, however, have a variable 
degree of disability on an individual basis, as indicated below, during which time they are 
unable to perform their usual activities. (1) In an uncomplicated pregnancy, disability 
occurs near the termination of pregnancy, during labor, delivery and the puerperium. 
The process of labor and puerperium is disabling in itself. The usual duration of such 
disability is approximately six to eight weeks. (2) Complications of a pregnancy may 
occur which give rise to other disability. Examples of such complications include tox-
emia, infection, hemorrhage, ectopic pregnancy, and abortion. (3) A woman with pre-
existing disease which in itself is not disabling, may become disabled with the addition of 
pregnancy. Certain patients with heart disease, diabetes, hypertensive cardiovascular dis-
ease, renal disease, and other systemic conditions may become disabled during their preg-
nancy because of the adverse effect pregnancy has upon these conditions. 
The onset, termination and cause of the disability, related to pregnancy, can only be 
determined by a physician. 
Policy Statement of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (adopted Mar. 2, 
1974), quoted in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 501 n.4 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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fied day have no problem. For women who are denied reinstatement 
when they seek to return to work, however, the availability of unem-
ployment compensation may be of great importance. This is espe-
cially true given that only a small minority of women are covered by 
private health plans for the time period of actual disability caused by 
pregnancy. 165 
Some courts have criticized the denial of benefits because of 
pregnancy, arguing that it forces a woman to choose between em-
ployment and childbirth through subtle economic pressures that de-
mean her role in the economy166 by frustrating her attempts to 
reenter the job market. 167 The district court in Porcher speculated 
that without .financial assistance, e.g., for expenses such as child care, 
recent mothers might not be able to compete in the employment pro-
cess with other applicants. 168 A woman who has withdrawn from 
the labor force will likely experience a decline in job status and 
hourly earnings upon her reentry.169 Further, when a woman leaves 
the work force, both the employer's and the woman's incentives to 
invest in her potential economic capacity are weakened.17° Thus, 
discouraging a woman from maintaining attachment to the labor 
force following pregnancy can cause long-term economic disadvan-
tage in addition to a short-term decline in her family's standard of 
li ' 171 vmg. 
Unemployment compensation is designed to provide partial 
wage replacement to the involuntarily unemployed worker so he or 
she can look for a job.172 The requirements of section 3304(a)(l2) do 
not mandate a departure from this purpose. The section does not 
necessarily require payment of benefits to a pregnant woman who 
165. See S. KAMERMAN, supra note 4, at 12. 
166. See, e.g., Buckley v. Coyle Pub. School Sys., 476 F.2d 92, 96 (1973) (school policy of 
termination after six months of pregnancy invades a woman's privacy by forcing her to choose 
between employment and pregnancy); Hanson v. Hutt, 83 Wash. 2d 195, 201, 517 P.2d 599, 
603 (1974) (rejecting argument that pregnant women are unattached to the labor market). Bui 
if. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 483-86 (1970) (nondiscriminatory allocation of wel-
fare benefits does not impermissibly burden family interests). Unemployment compensation, 
however, is distinguished from general welfare. Welfare payments are to provide subsistence, 
while unemployment compensation serves to replace lost earnings. See Super Tire Engg. Co. 
v. Mccorkle, 550 F.2d 903, 908 (3d Cir. 1977). 
167. See Conlin, Equal Protection Versus Equal Rights Amendment - Where Are We 
Now?, 24 DRAKE L. REV. 259, 306 (1975). 
168. 502 F. Supp. at 956. 
169. See E. APPLEBAUM, BACK TO WORK: DETERMINANTS OF WOMEN'S SUCCESSFUL RE-
ENTRY 45-54 (1981). 
170. Sandell, Lifetime Participation in the Labor Force and Unemployment Among Mature 
Women, in WOMEN IN THE U.S. LABOR FORCE 142, 151 (A.F. Cahn ed. 1979), 
171. See E. APPLEBAUM, supra note 169, at 28-29. 
172. See California Dept. of Human Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 132 (1971) 
(citing Hearings on R.R. 4120 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 74th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 214 (1935) (statement of federal relief administrator and member of the Co=ittee on 
Economic Security)). 
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left work before truly disabled or who, for personal reasons, did not 
return to work when able after childbirth.173 Nor does this section 
prevent the states from imposing a period of disqualification on 
pregnant women who are unable to or unavailable for work. 174 
What section 3304(a)(12) does prohibit is the denial of benefits to an 
otherwise eligible individual solely because she left her last employ-
ment because of pregnancy or because she is currently pregnant. 
In the absence of section 3304(a)(l2), perhaps a state could treat 
pregnancy as any other medical condition for purposes of unemploy-
ment compensation, without endangering its claim to federal funds. 
This would be consistent with the policy of allowing the states to 
formulate their own guidelines in areas not covered by the Federal 
Act. 175 Congress, however, enacted section 3304(a)(12) in 1976 as a 
prohibition against denying benefits solely on the basis of pregnancy 
or termination of pregnancy. The fact that pregnancy is in some 
respects like an illness176 does not necessarily imply that it must be 
treated as such for all purposes. 
In section 3304(a)(l2) Congress specifically addressed the issue of 
denial of benefits based on pregnancy. Perhaps, ideally, Congress 
should prohibit disqualification on the basis of separation due to any 
bona fide medical condition. The process of legislating, however, 
necessarily involves the drawing of lines.177 The fact that Congress 
chose to focus on only one aspect of the problem178 does not alter the 
binding nature of the remedy elected. 
The original purpose of federal unemployment legislation was to 
induce the states to provide benefits to certain workers when the 
173. See Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 10, at 23 ( discussing likely impact of alternative 
applications of the Porcher decision). The exact date upon which a pregnant woman should 
leave work or return to work after childbirth is a medical decision that should be reached by 
the woman and her doctor. 
174. See note 23 supra and accompanying text; note 120 supra. 
175. See note 111 supra. Bella Abzug, congresswoman from New York, taking the floor in 
support of the 1975 Unemployment Compensation Amendments as presented in H.B. 10210, 
co=ented: 
I want to co=end the committee for including section 312 which prohibits States 
from delaying or terminating benefits solely on the basis of pregnancy. This exclusion, 
which has been challenged by court action in several States, has placed an additional 
burden on women seeking to collect benefits. 
The decision when to terminate one's employment because of pregnancy is an individ-
ual one to be decided by the woman and her doctor. So long as a woman is available for 
work she is entitled to collect unemployment compensation. 
122 CONG. REC. 22516 (1976). 
176. See notes 138-54 supra and accompanying text. 
177. See Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 174 (1978) ("Social welfare legislation, by 
its very nature, involves drawing lines among categories of people . . . ."); Massachusetts Bd. 
of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,314 (1976) (per curiam). 
178. In the context of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that Congress may act to eliminate an evil without simul-
taneously remedying every related evil. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 485 
(1980); Cleland v. National College of Business, 435 U.S. 213, 220 (1978) (per curiam). 
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states may not have done so on their own initiative.179 Allowing the 
states to deny compensation to otherwise eligible women returning 
to the work force after or during pregnancy thus frustrates one of the 
most basic goals of the program. Under the framework of FUTA, 
the states are given a choice: to comply with the Act's fundamental 
standards or to forgo federal assistance. 180 Policies that encourage 
eligible women to pursue their job search best serve the broad reme-
dial purposes of FUTA.1s1 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In 1976, Congress addressed an issue of substantial concern to 
working women: the availability of unemployment compensation to 
persons whose unemployment results from pregnancy. By adding 
section 3304(a)(l2) to the list of fundamental federal standards, Con-
gress sought to enjoin the states from denying benefits to otherwise 
eligible claimants solely because they left their last employment due 
to a pregnancy-related disability. In enacting section 3304(a)(12), 
Congress recognized that women who are otherwise attached to the 
work force may become displaced by the period of disability that 
necessarily accompanies childbirth. The intent of the legislature was 
to bring these women within the coverage of the federal act precisely 
because some states denied benefits to pregnant or formerly-preg-
nant women despite their ability to work and availability for 
employment. 
The intent expressed by Congress in enacting section 3304(a)(l2) 
is consistent with the realities of the changing American labor force. 
Increasing numbers of women join the labor force each year. The 
majority of these women will become pregnant at some point in their 
working lives. Denial of income security to these women demeans 
their economic role in society by frustrating their attempts to reenter 
the work force. Furthermore, because pregnancy uniquely affects 
women, policies that deny benefits on the basis of pregnancy create 
the potential for intentional or effective gender discrimination. 
The interpretation of section 3304(a)(l2) advanced by several 
states and endorsed by the Department of Labor directly contra-
venes the language of that statute and the policy behind it. Congress 
enacted section 3304(a)(l2) as an express prohibition against denial 
of unemployment compensation to claimants who would have re-
ceived benefits but for the fact that they left their last employment 
because of pregnancy. Congress intended to leave the decision of 
when a pregnant woman should terminate her employment to the 
179. See note 3S supra. 
180. See New Hampshire Dept. of Employment Sec. v. Marshall, 616 F.2d 240, 241 (1st 
Cir.), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 806 (1980). 
181. Porcher, S02 F. Supp. at 9S6. 
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woman and her physician. To allow the states to label such a termi-
nation voluntary and thus deny benefits defeats the very purpose of 
the section. Similarly, allowing the states to treat pregnancy like any 
other medical condition ignores the fact that Congress specifically 
addressed the issue of pregnancy-related disqualification in section 
3304(a)(l2). 
